Libya and weapons of mass destruction

Libya
Nuclear program start date 1969
First nuclear weapon test None
First fusion weapon test None
Last nuclear test None
Largest yield test None
Total tests None
Peak stockpile None
Current stockpile None; the program was dismantled in 2003.
Maximum missile range 300 km (Scud-B)
NPT signatory Yes

Libya possesses chemical weapons and ballistic missiles and previously pursued nuclear weapons under the leadership of Muammar Gaddafi. On 19 December 2003, Gaddafi announced that Libya would voluntarily eliminate all materials, equipment and programs that could lead to internationally proscribed weapons, including weapons of mass destruction and long-range ballistic missiles.[1][2][3] Libya signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 and ratified it in 1975, and concluded safeguard agreement with IAEA in 1980.[4] The United States and Great Britain assisted Libya in removing equipment and material from Libya's nuclear weapons program, with independent verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency.[3] Libya acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention effective February 5, 2004[5] and destroyed its chemical munitions later that year,[6] but missed the deadlines for converting its chemical weapons production facility to peaceful use and for destroying its stockpile of mustard agent.[7]

Contents

Nuclear program

Libya signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in July 1968, under King Idris, ratified it in 1975, under Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, and concluded a safeguards agreement in 1980. In 1981, the Soviet Union supplied a 10 MW research reactor at Tajoura.[3] Colonel Gaddafi began to look at the illicit nuclear proliferation networks and various black market sources, including Swiss nuclear engineer Friedrich Tinner. In 1970, in a meeting with Zhou Enlai, Premier of the People's Republic of China, Colonel Gaddafi an unsuccessful attempt for a purchase of nuclear weapon, but it was denied by China.[3][8] In 1974, while attending the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in Lahore (Pakistan), Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Prime minister at that time, delegated Libya to participate in its clandestine programme, the Project-706.[9] But, by the time, Libyan technicians joined this programme, Bhutto was executed by the order of Pakistan Supreme Court.[9] The new Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) General Zia-ul-Haque distrusted and hated Colonel Gaddafi, and Libyan scientists were carefully removed from the participation as they were told to leave the country immediately.[9] During this time, Libyan Intelligence made an unsuccessful attempts to infiltrate in Pakistan's high-powered research institutes but such attempts were thwarted by ISI as they had arrested and intercepted Libyan agents.[8]

Colonel Gaddafi did not wanted to give up, therefore, Libya turned to India, an arch rival of Pakistan, for nuclear assistance.[3][10] In 1978, Libyan agents persuaded India and tried to buy the nuclear weapons from India.[10] However, as part of India's Atoms for Peace program, a nuclear energy pact was signed by Libya and India.[3][10] It is unclear how much interaction and cooperation was made by both countries.[3] Through out the 1970s and 1980s, Libya made a tremendous effort to acquire the weapon from various sources despite facing difficulties in academic progress.[3] In the 1970s, Libya pursued the uranium enrichment process and made an enormous effort to gain access to uranium ore, uranium conversion facilities, and enrichment technologies that together would have enabled Libya to produce weapons-grade uranium.[3] The approach failed in 1979, and in 1980 Libya decided to pursue a plutonium-based pathway to nuclear weapons.[3] On multiple times, Libya violated its signed treaty and imported 1,200 tons of uranium ore concentrate from French-controlled mines in Niger without declaring it to the IAEA, as required by the NPT.[3] In 1982, Libya attempted to purchase a plant for manufacturing uranium tetrafluoride (UF6) from Belgium.[3] At the time, Libya had no declared nuclear facilities that required uranium tetrafluoride, and the purchase was refused.[3]

In 1981, the Soviet Union finally agreed to build a nuclear facility, completely under IAEA safeguards and inspection. Known as Tajura Nuclear Research Facility (TNRF), Libya conducted illegal uranium conversion experiments there.[3] An unknown nuclear weapon state, whose name has kept in secrecy by IAEA, also allegedly assisted Libya in these experiments.[3] Nuclear expert, David Albright, of the Institute for Science and International Security said Soviet Union and China were the most likely suspects.[3] In 1980, a foreign expert at the facility began to conduct experiments at the Tajoura Nuclear Research Center in Libya aimed at producing gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment.[3] The IAEA reported that it was Friedrich Tinner, a nuclear engineer from Switzerland, a former employee of the IAEA.[3] Tinner completed the work in 1992, but Libya was not yet able to produce an operating centrifuge, and no centrifuge experiments involving nuclear materials had been conducted.[3] Tinner left for Pakistan, and the centrifuge program was abandoned and dismantled.[3] In 1995, Tinner returned to Libya and tried to re-start the program.[3] In 1997, Tinner began to receive technical assistance from various sources, as Libya had made a strategic decision to start the program with new attitude.[3] In 1997, Libya received the provided 20 pre-assembled L-1 centrifuges and components for an additional 200 L-1 centrifuges and related parts from foreign suppliers. One of the 20 pre-assembled rotors was used to install a completed single centrifuge at the Al Hashan site, which was first successfully tested in October 2000. Libya reported to the IAEA that no nuclear material had been used during tests on the L-1 centrifuges.[3]

In 2000, Libya accelerated its efforts as Tinner being the head of the program. Libya began to order centrifuges and components from other countries with the intention of installing a centrifuge plant to make enriched uranium.[3]

Libya received many documents on the design and operation of centrifuges. But Libya and Tinner suffered many setbacks in evaluating these designs as they were too difficult to interpret and bring into operation. Libya ultimately told IAEA investigators that it had no national personnel competent to evaluate these designs at that time, and due to its extreme difficulty, Libya would have had to ask the supplier for help if it had decided to pursue a nuclear weapon.

Foreign assistance

In 1980, Soviet Union served as big partner of Libya in its nuclear programme.[10] Soviet Union built two nuclear research facilities, which was put under IAEA safeguards. The first being the Al Hashan Facility (AHF) and other one being the Tajura Nuclear Research Facility (TNRF).[10] Libyan nuclear programme repeatedly suffered with mismanagement and loss of academic generation.[10] The Tajura facility was ran under the Soviet experts and staffed by small number of inexperienced 750 Libyan specialists and technicians aided by Soviet staff.[10] In 1984, Libya negotiated with the Soviet Union for a supply of nuclear power plant, but its retro technology had dissatisfied Colonel Gaddafi.[10] Gaddafi negotiated with Belgium but the talks failed.[10] In 1984, Libya ordered a pilot scale uranium conversion facility, and negotiated with Japan for it.[10] A Japanese company supplied Libya with the technology and the sale was apparently arranged directly with the Japanese instead of through middlemen.[10] The facility was established near at the Al Hashan Facility and the research was started.[10]

However, after Friedrich Tinner joined the program and became its head.[10] Libya employed a large number of black market sources.[10] Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, a senior scientist, was debriefed after he made a national wide confession in Pakistan to have been sold sensitive of designs centrifuges through Tinner to Libya.[10]

Dismantlement

In 2003, U.S. intelligence agencies raided a cargo ship and seized a subsequent consignment of centrifuge-related equipment bound for Libya in a northern Mediterranean port. The U.S. investigations revealed that many of these components were manufactured by the Scomi Precision Engineering facility in Malaysia and were produced under technical guidance of Dr. A.Q. Khan, and various nationals from the United Kingdom, Germany, and Switzerland. After the news became public, Libyan ambitions were cooled down and demoralized.[3]

According to some analysts, the 11 September 2001 attacks, which Qaddafi denounced, and the impending U.S. invasion of Iraq increased Libya's desire to make peace with the United States. Libyan officials began to meet covertly with British, Russian, and U.S. officials to officially dismantle the program. In March 2003, days before the invasion of Iraq, Qaddafi's personal envoys contacted U.S. President George Bush, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and British Prime minister Tony Blair about Libya's willingness to dismantle program. Subsequently, at Qaddafi's direction, Libyan officials provided British, Russian, and U.S. diplomats with documentation and additional details on Libya's chemical, biological, nuclear, and ballistic missile activities. Libya reportedly allowed Russian, U.S., and British officials to visit 10 previously secret sites and dozens of Libyan laboratories and military factories to search for evidence of nuclear fuel cycle-related activities, and for chemical and missile program.

On 19 December 2003, Gaddafi made a surprise announcement to dismantle the program. Libya agreed to destroy all of its chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons. Libya provided the designs of centrifuges to U.S. officials and gave the name of its suppliers. The revelation led the debriefing of Abdul Qadeer Khan - one of Pakistan's senior and top scientist. In 2004, the United States, along with IAEA officials and Interpol, led the arrest of Libyan nuclear program's former head Friedrich Tinner. On 22 January 2004, U.S. transport planes carried 55,000 pounds of documents and equipment related to Libya's nuclear and ballistic missile programs to the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee, United States. In March 2004, over 1,000 additional centrifuge and missile parts were shipped out of Libya.

Post-Gaddafi

On 22 September 2011, near Sabha, towards the end of the 2011 Libyan civil war, anti-Gaddafi forces discovered two warehouses containing thousands of blue barrels marked with tape saying "radioactive" and plastic bags of yellow powder sealed with the same tape.[11][12] The IAEA stated, "We can confirm that there is yellowcake stored in drums at a site near Sabha ... which Libya previously declared to the IAEA. ... The IAEA has tentatively scheduled safeguards activities at this location once the situation in the country stabilises."[13]

Chemical weapons

Libya maintained a chemical weapons programme under Muammar Gaddafi's rule, but it was ostensibly decommissioned in the 2000s and early 2010s as Gaddafi sought to normalise relations between the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the Western world. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons supervised the destruction of Libya's chemical weapons caches through February 2011, when it was forced to suspend its operations due to the uprising against Gaddafi and the resulting deterioration of the country's stability. In early September 2011, OPCW Director-General Ahmet Üzümcü said reports he had received indicated that the remaining weapons were secure and had not fallen into the hands of militant groups.[14] A stockpile of mustard gas, which the OPCW reported the regime may have attempted to hide from inspectors overseeing the chemical weapons programme's dismantlement, was reportedly found in the Al Jufrah District by anti-Gaddafi fighters less than two weeks later.[15]

Libya's National Transitional Council is cooperating with the OCPW regarding the destruction of all legacy chemical weapons in the country.[16] After assessing the chemical stockpiles the Libyan government will receive a deadline from the OPCW to destroy the weapons.[17]

Ballistic missiles

Libyan Army forces loyal to Gaddafi reportedly fired several Scud-B surface-to-surface missiles at areas in revolt against the regime, including Misrata and Ajdabiya, during the 2011 civil war, but the weapons missed their targets.[18][19][20] Several more Scuds, with launchers, were located by anti-Gaddafi fighters near Tripoli and Sirte.[21][22]

References

  1. ^ Chronology of Libya's Disarmament and Relations with the United States, Arms Control Association.
  2. ^ News Update on IAEA & Libya, Chronology of Key Events, (December 2003 - September 2008), International Atomic Energy Agency.
  3. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y Rohlfing, Joan (Updated). "Libya: Nuclear Programme Overview". Nuclear Threat Initiative. Nuclear Threat Initiative. http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Libya/Nuclear/index.html. Retrieved 11-08-2011. 
  4. ^ GOV/2004/12, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Report by the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, 20 February 2004.
  5. ^ The Chemical Weapons Convention Enters Into Force in Libya, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 2 February 2004.
  6. ^ Zanders, Jean Pascal (19 May). "Destroying Libya's Chemical Weapons: Deadlines and Delays". James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS). http://cns.miis.edu/wmdjunction/110519_destroying_libya_cw.htm. Retrieved 13 August 2011. 
  7. ^ Zanders, Jean Pascal (May 19). "Uprising in Libya: The False Specter of Chemical Warfare". James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS). http://cns.miis.edu/wmdjunction/110519_destroying_libya_cw.htm. Retrieved 13 August 2011. 
  8. ^ a b Nazi, Nazir Naji (2010). "Colonel Gaddafi's Libya and his Nuclear ambitions". Nazir Nazi and Jang Group of Media. 
  9. ^ a b c Stengel, Richard (Monday, Jun. 03, 1985). "Who has the Bomb?". Time magazine: pp. 7/13. Archived from the original on Jun. 03, 1985. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,957761-7,00.html. Retrieved February 23, 2011 
  10. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o "Libyan nuclear programme". http://www.globalsecurity.org. GlobalSecurity.org and John E. Pike. Updated. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/libya/nuclear.htm. Retrieved 08-12-2011. 
  11. ^ Libya military site yields possible radioactive material
  12. ^ Libya's Ex-PM Held As Chemical Weapons Found
  13. ^ Dahl, Fredrik; Angus MacSwan (2011-09-22). "Raw uranium stored near Libya's Sabha - IAEA". Thomson Reuters. Archived from the original on 2011-09-24. http://af.reuters.com/article/libyaNews/idAFL5E7KM4TQ20110922?sp=true. Retrieved 2011-09-24. 
  14. ^ "Libya: Chemical Weapons Secure According To U.N. Watchdog". The Huffington Post. 7 September 2011. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/07/libya-chemical-weapons_n_952020.html. Retrieved 25 September 2011. 
  15. ^ Black, Ian (22 September 2011). "Libyan rebels discover Gaddafi's chemical weapons". The Guardian. London. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/sep/22/libyan-rebels-gaddafis-chemical-weapons?newsfeed=true. Retrieved 25 September 2011. 
  16. ^ http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Libyas_NTC_pledges_to_destroy_chemical_weapons_OPCW_999.html
  17. ^ http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Chemical_weapons_inspectors_to_return_to_Libya_999.html
  18. ^ "Libya conflict: Gaddafi forces 'launched Scud missile'". BBC News. 16 August 2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14538670. Retrieved 25 September 2011. 
  19. ^ "Gadhafi's Forces Fired 3 Scuds at Misrata: NATO". DefenseNews. 23 August 2011. http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=7457858. Retrieved 25 September 2011. 
  20. ^ "Libyan Rebels Advance on Sirte Amid Protests Over Appointments". SFGate. 29 August 2011. http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/g/a/2011/08/29/bloomberg1376-LQOH7B1A1I4H01-062PRCVAAAN8DMGEEHICQN43MO.DTL. Retrieved 25 September 2011. 
  21. ^ "Gaddafi missiles could be scrapped". IOL News. 22 September 2011. http://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/gaddafi-missiles-could-be-scrapped-1.1142836. Retrieved 25 September 2011. 
  22. ^ "Scud missile battery sits unguarded outside Tripoli". TVNZ. 5 September 2011. http://tvnz.co.nz/world-news/scud-missile-battery-sits-unguarded-outside-tripoli-4385543. Retrieved 25 September 2011. 

See also